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People must perceive real costs in order to
reduce them. Hence, policies that impede the
accurate perception of real costs are ipso facto
inimical to growth. Inflation is the most
obvious, probably the most pervasive, and
almost certainly the most noxious of such
policies... The most serious cost of inflation is




onetary policy in Canada, as in
many other industrial countries,
has been focused on achieving
some form of price stability.2 After the
move to a flexible exchange rate regime in
May 1970, various approaches to estab-
lishing a nominal anchor to achieve infla-
tion control in Canada were tried by the
Bank of Canada. These initiatives occurred
in the context of an inflation that began
to accelerate in the second half of the
1960s and reached the highest rates expe-
rienced in some two decades in the 1970s
and early 1980s.
In the second half of the 1970s, target
ranges for growth in the money supply were
used as the nominal anchor. They were aban-
doned in the early 1980s because the relation
being used became unstable with innovations
in financial markets. Subsequently, an eclec-
tic approach, focusing on adjusting to shocks
partly via interest rate movements and part-
ly via exchange rate movements, was fol-
lowed. However, at the end of the 1980s
there was still uncertainty as to what policy-
makers meant when they talked about
achieving price stability and the benefits that
it would bring.
In February 1991, the Government of
Canada and the Bank of Canada jointly
announced a set of inflation-reduction tar-
gets for Canada culminating in a target of 2
percent by end 1995 (with bands of +/- 1
percent around it). The current range of 1
to 3 percent was extended twice, in late
1993 (to cover the three-year period start-
ing the end of 1995) and early 1998. The
extensions reflected the fact that both the
government and the Bank believed that
more experience with a low inflation envi-
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jenkins.qxd  24/05/01  9:59 AM  Page 89be made on a long-run target for monetary
policy. The current agreement continues
until the end of 2001.
In addressing the contribution of mon-
etary policy to the economic well-being of
Canadians in the 1990s, this paper focuses on
two elements: (1) the introduction of the
inflation targets along with the associated
changes in the framework for the conduct of
monetary policy, and (2) the performance of
the Canadian economy, especially once fiscal
and monetary policy became mutually rein-
forcing. It starts with a brief review of why
central banks around the world have adopt-
ed policies aimed at achieving and maintain-
ing price stability, and what are the current
issues around the choice of a target, or opti-
mal, rate of inflation.
The paper then moves into the contri-
bution of monetary policy in Canada to the
economic well-being of Canadians. Here, the
discussion is divided into two parts. First, we
review the changes that have occurred in
developing a coherent monetary policy
framework in Canada anchored to our explic-
it inflation-control targets introduced in
1991. Second, we present the accumulation
of evidence supporting the view that
Canada’s low and stable inflation environ-
ment established in the 1990s began to show
tangible benefits as we progressed through
the decade.
In this context, we argue that the shift
in fiscal policy, put in place by the mid-
1990s, to eliminate deficits and reduce the
ratio of public debt to the size of our econo-
my led to declines in risk premiums and to
levels of interest rates consistent with our low
inflation performance. The rise in national
savings and associated declines in real inter-
est rates have encouraged a significant pick-
up in investment in equipment and technol-
ogy, which were essential for the rise in pro-
ductivity we have begun to see lately.
WHY FOCUS ON PRICE 
STABILITY?3
Over the period from the mid-1950s
until the mid-1960s, Canada experienced a
relatively low rate of inflation, between 1 and
2 percent year-to-year growth in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI), with no sys-
tematic tendency for it to move higher or
lower. In the 1970s and early 1980s, infla-
tion moved much higher, reaching 10 per-
cent or more at times, before settling down
to 4 percent for a good part of the 1980s. It
started to move up again in the late 1980s
and early 1990s as excess demand pressures
again began to emerge.
Canada’s inflation experience in the
post-World War II period was not unique and
its monetary policy formulation reflected the
consensus view of the public and the econom-
ics profession as to what could be done with
monetary policy. Some 30-odd years ago there
was a widespread belief that policy-makers
could fine-tune the monetary and fiscal poli-
cy levers in order to dampen business cycles.
Essentially, two developments sup-
ported this belief: (1) the availability of
macroeconometric models that were thought
at the time to be able to predict reasonably
well the impact on the economy of changes
in fiscal and monetary policy, and (2) the
Samuelson-Solow argument that there was an
exploitable long-run Phillips-curve trade-off.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, these ideas
had some influence on both the research pro-
gram and policy formulation process at the
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more in-depth discussion of this period.)
The experience of the 1970s and
developments in the economics literature
made it clear that there were at least four
major difficulties with having a monetary
policy directed towards fine-tuning the
economy. First, the long and variable lags
between a monetary policy action and its
result meant that action to stimulate the
economy, for example, could be having its
effect just as the economy was reaching full
capacity, leading to overheating and infla-
tion. Second, and equally important, there
was no long-run trade-off between inflation
and unemployment once the adjustment in
inflation expectations was taken into
account. Third, a monetary authority with
an inflationary bias could not consistently
count on surprises to stimulate the econo-
my since people in the economy would
eventually anticipate such a response and
quickly raise their inflation expectations
(time inconsistency). Fourth, there was an
overly optimistic view of potential output
and productivity growth.
Ultimately, price stability in the form
of low and stable inflation came to be seen as
the contribution monetary policy could make
to support a more efficient functioning of the
economic system. The economy would then
be able to achieve the highest standard of liv-
ing possible given its social and institution-
al arrangements. This choice came out of the
broad acceptance that there are costs to infla-
tion, costs which become more evident at
higher rates of inflation.
One set of costs arises from the fact
that inflation and inflation uncertainty go
together (Chart 1). That is, the higher the
inflation rate, the more uncertain people are
about its future path. As a result, they have
trouble determining the “real costs” of tak-
ing various types of decisions, especially
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CHART 1
(a) Inflation and Inflation Uncertainty
(b) Long-Term Dispersion of Inflation 
Expectations
inflation uncertainty (four quarters ahead)
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Source: Crawford and Kasumovich (1996) updated.
Inflation uncertainty is measured by the conditional vari-
ance of the forecast errors from an ARCH model of infla-
tion. CPIXFET is the CPI less food, energy and the effect
of indirect taxes.
Source: Stuber (2001). The inflation uncertainty meas-
ures are based on the dispersion of forecasts for infla-
tion six to fifteen years ahead by participants in a survey
of economists and portfolio managers published by
KPMG.
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long-lasting. Decisions to buy now or to
wait, and decisions on what to do to protect
wealth or how much to save for future con-
sumption, are more difficult to make with
the added uncertainty arising from infla-
tion. (See O’Reilly 1998 for an in-depth
review of some of these costs.)
Empirically, it has been difficult to
measure the benefits that accrue from an
ongoing low and stable rate of inflation and
to compare these with the costs of getting
inflation down. The reasons include: not
having a sufficient number of low-inflation
periods, especially periods when low infla-
tion was the clear objective of policy; deal-
ing with the endogeneity of inflation; trying
to make inferences about long-run relation-
ships using short-run movements in the
data; and trying to see in aggregate data
what is often essentially a microeconomic
problem — distinguishing between real and
nominal price changes. (For more detail,
see O’Reilly 1998; Ragan 1998, 2000;
Stuber 2001; Temple 2000.)
New techniques are being used to
overcome some of the technical questions
raised about the earlier empirical work that
tried to identify an inflation rate above
which inflation and economic activity are
negatively related (see Ghosh and Phillips
1998; Khan and Senhadji 2000). Other
work looking at inflation and tax interac-
tions suggests that there could be large
gains to reducing inflation to zero. (See
Feldstein 1999 for papers on various coun-
tries; O’Reilly and Levac 2000 on Canada;
Bonato 1998 on New Zealand.)
Given the complexity of these
issues, it is likely that the economics lit-
erature and the techniques used will con-
tinue to evolve in terms of identifying an
optimal rate of inflation. But based on
the available evidence, some researchers
have made the case for choosing one rate
over another.
Konieczny (1994) focuses on the role
of money as a standard of value analogous to
standard measures in other areas. He argues
that inflation erodes the role of money as a
unit of account, or a monetary standard.
This is not allowed to happen in other
spheres of activity where much emphasis is
placed on having a constant standard.
Inflation creates confusion because, while
one can recognize that it exists, it may be
much more difficult to incorporate the
information in formulating and taking deci-
sions. Konieczny uses the true-life example
of a plane crashing to demonstrate that even
a simple calculation like converting gallons
into litres can go wrong. He argues that
even more information is required to make
forward-looking decisions in a world with
inflation. People need to “know the history
of the price level as well as the date of the
last price sampling” (p. 13).
That this is not easy to do is given
some support in work reported in Shafir,
Diamond and Tversky (1997). This work
finds evidence that, unless questions are
framed in a particular way, respondents con-
fuse nominal and real values in their answers.
This observation should not be surprising
given that nominal values are used in tax and
accounting frameworks and in all other mar-
ket activities, including those affecting sav-
ings and investment decisions. Analysis of a
cross-country survey (some 38 countries)
leads to the conclusion that the poor are more
likely than the rich to mention inflation as a
top national concern (Easterly and Fischer
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2000). While indexation is sometimes pro-
posed as the solution, there is some reluc-
tance to use it (Shiller 1997b).4 Thus
researchers who follow Konieczny’s line of
reasoning argue for zero inflation, or an
unchanged price level.
More specific evidence from Canada
that even low and steady inflation can even-
tually have noticeable effects was in the
increasing concern shown by Canadians in
the last few years about the effect of bracket
creep in the personal tax system on their
after-tax incomes. This experience clearly
indicates that even low and stable inflation,
as experienced in the 1990s, can have effects
that are noticed within relatively short peri-
ods of time. Some of the examples provided
in the February 2000 budget documents
show that a five-year horizon with inflation
as low as 1 1/2 percent is sufficient to shift
people into a higher tax bracket even when
their real circumstances have not changed.5
While this particular situation was easily
resolved by the introduction of full indexa-
tion of the personal tax brackets, most
arrangements in the economy are in nominal
terms and require people to make decisions
after expending time and effort to undertake
the information gathering and processing
mentioned by Konieczny (1994).
If people can point to examples of the
cost of inflation in their daily lives and have
a general mistrust of inflation (Easterly and
Fischer 2000; Shiller 1997a), why is an
unchanged price level not the obvious target
for monetary policy? Essentially there are
four main reasons advanced for having some
positive inflation: measurement bias; down-
ward nominal wage rigidity; the zero bound
on nominal interest rates; and the fear of
entering a deflationary spiral.
Measurement bias has to do with the
difficulty of accurately measuring price
changes in a market economy where there is
ongoing change in product quality and
attributes, including services, and the ways
in which they are sold. Research suggests
that the measurement bias in Canada is small
— about a half percentage point per year in
the year-to-year growth in the CPI (Crawford
and Harrison 1998).
The argument for downward nominal
wage rigidity presupposes that workers will
resist nominal wage declines other than in
exceptional circumstances, such as near-bank-
ruptcy of the company by whom they are
employed. Fortin (1996) and Akerlof,
Dickens and Perry (1996) argue that down-
ward nominal wage rigidity is a fundamental
characteristic of, respectively, the Canadian
and US labour markets.6 As a result, if infla-
tion settles below a certain rate, there would
be a permanent increase in unemployment
relative to what it would be otherwise. Fortin
(1996) suggests that a 2 to 4 percent range
for the inflation target in Canada would avoid
this problem. There is some empirical work
suggesting that downward nominal wage
rigidity is an important characteristic of the
Canadian economy (Simpson, Cameron and
Hum 1998), though other empirical work
suggests that it is not (Beaudry and Doyle
2001; Farès and Lemieux 2001; Faruqui
2000; Crawford 2001; Crawford and Harrison
1998; Crawford and Wright 2001). Others
have argued that downward nominal wage
rigidity is a legacy of the ongoing inflation in
the post-World War II period and that such
money illusion would not continue to exist in
a world of low or no inflation. In any case, the
recent experiences of the United States, the
United Kingdom and Canada suggest that
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ployment and high rates of economic activi-
ty, all relative to each country’s recent
historical experience.
The concern about a zero bound on
nominal interest rates is based on two facts: (1)
people can avoid a negative return by holding
cash, and (2) monetary policy contributes to
stabilizing the economy by raising or lower-
ing real interest rates. In a world where price
stability is defined as either zero or very low
inflation, there is the possibility that mone-
tary policy would not be able to lower inter-
est rates enough to contribute to an economic
recovery. A broad assessment of the literature
suggests that the zero bound is unlikely to
prevent a monetary policy with an inflation
target from contributing to the stabilization
of the economy (Amirault and O’Reilly 2001).
Even though deflation is defined as a
sustained decline in the price level, some
researchers have argued that a constant price-
level target (in combination with the zero
bound on the nominal interest rate) could
lead to a deflationary spiral. Other researchers
have extended this concern to a world where
price stability is defined to be a low rate of
inflation. However, the real issues centre
around the strength with which expectations
are anchored on the target for price change
and how symmetric the monetary authority
is in responding to movements away from it.
Assuming an environment where a
considerable amount of credibility is given
to the monetary authority’s commitment to
a price-level target, some researchers have
made the point that expectations about infla-
tion would work in such a way as to support
achievement of that target. For example, if
the price level were to move below its target
level, a credible target would lead to expec-
tations of higher inflation in the short run as
the price level was brought back to the tar-
get level. As a result, the expected real inter-
est rate would decline, leading to increased
economic activity. (See Duguay 1994;
Coulombe 1998; Wolman 2000.)
CHANGES IN THE FRAMEWORK
FOR CANADIAN MONETARY 
POLICY IN THE 1990s7
Throughout the 1990s a number of
initiatives were undertaken in Canada to clar-
ify and strengthen the monetary policy
framework (see Thiessen 2000). The policy
framework includes the goal for monetary
policy, the approach to implementation of
policy, dealing with uncertainty, and the
reporting and accountability arrangements.8
The Goal of Monetary Policy
A fundamental change in Canada’s
monetary policy framework occurred in the
1990s. That change was the introduction of
a joint Bank of Canada/Government of
Canada statement of explicit inflation-con-
trol targets for achieving and maintaining
price stability. Even though the Bank had a
longstanding commitment to price stabili-
ty, an explicit definition of this goal had
never been given. Indeed, some analysts
suggested that there seemed to be a differ-
ence of view between the Bank’s vision for
price stability as enunciated, for example, in
John Crow’s 1988 Hanson lecture and the
expectation of the Department of Finance as
shown by the assumptions for inflation in
the budget documents at the time. (See
Johnson 1990.) Hence, the joint announce-
ment of inflation-control targets was a
94
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monetary policy and in providing a nomi-
nal anchor for economic decisions.
There have been three joint
announcements of the inflation targets thus
far: the introduction of inflation-reduction
targets in February 1991 with the aim of
keeping the year-to-year change in the CPI
in a band of 1 to 3 percent (midpoint 2 per-
cent) by the end of 1995; an extension of
the 1 to 3 percent band to end 1998 in
December 1993; and a further extension,
on 24 February 1998, of the existing infla-
tion-control target range to the end of
2001.9 (See Chart 2.) At the time of the last
extension it was agreed that the govern-
ment and the Bank would decide on the
long-run target for monetary policy before
the end of 2001.
In preparation for the decision to be
taken in 2001, and similar to what took
place leading up to the decisions in 1993 and
1998, the Bank organized and hosted a sem-
inar in 2000 where research on relevant issues
could be presented and discussed. In addi-
tion, interested academics, and staff at the
Bank and Department of Finance have ongo-
ing research programs and keep abreast of
advances reported in the literature on price
stability issues. Research is published in pro-
fessional publications, conference volumes,
technical reports and working papers.
While the goal for the inflation target
for monetary policy is determined jointly, the
Bank retains sole responsibility for achieving
it. To enhance its ability to do so, the Bank
undertook various initiatives in the 1990s to
make it much clearer to all interested parties
how it saw developments in the Canadian
economy, and how it was acting to achieve
and maintain the goal assigned to it.
The Implementation of
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is implemented main-
ly through changes in short-term interest
rates, specifically the Bank Rate, which is the
rate of interest that the Bank of Canada
charges on overnight loans to financial insti-
tutions. A change in the Bank Rate influences
other interest rates and the exchange rate,
leading to changes in the level of spending and
economic activity, which in turn affect infla-
tion over a period of six to eight quarters.
In the early 1990s, the Bank Rate was
based on the three-month treasury bill rate
and monetary policy operations were focused
on both the overnight and treasury bill mar-
kets. Starting in 1994, the Bank changed
tactics to be more explicit about the range it
desired for the overnight interest rate and to
allow the three-month rate to respond to
market conditions. The Bank’s objective in
specifying a 50-point target band for the
95
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use of alternative reaction functions.10
While these types of uncertainties are
ones that the Bank must contend with as best
it can in conducting monetary policy, the ini-
tiatives to increase reporting and accountabil-
ity discussed below were made to help reduce
uncertainties about Bank of Canada behaviour.
Reporting and Accountability
Arrangements
Complementing the move to a clear
target for inflation were measures to enhance
the transparency of the Bank’s assessment of
the economy and of its operations. In taking
these steps, the Bank of Canada is in the
company of other central banks around the
world in adopting the view that monetary
policy can be more effective in supporting
good economic performance if there is a clear
understanding of objectives, the means for
achieving them and the central bank’s assess-
ment of the state of its economy.
Central banks in most major industri-
al countries now publish in one form or
another their views about the outlook for
inflation and output in their economies, and
the risks and uncertainties surrounding that
outlook. Given the potential for portfolio
adjustments to affect interest (and exchange)
rates, it is particularly useful if financial mar-
ket participants and central banks have sim-
ilar views about the economic situation and
the thrust of monetary policy. Transparency
is also important in terms of holding central
banks accountable for their actions.
In terms of Bank of Canada initiatives
in the 1990s, the Monetary Policy Report, pub-
lished each May and November since 1995,
has offered the views of the Governing
Council (the Governor, Senior Deputy
Paul Jenkins and Brian O’Reilly
overnight rate was to reduce uncertainty
about its intentions, hence improving the
transmission of monetary policy actions both
to interest rates further out along the yield
curve and to the exchange rate.
Further clarity on the Bank’s intention
was achieved with the announcement in
February 1996 that the Bank Rate would
establish the upper end of the operating
band, and that changes in the operating
band would subsequently be accompanied
by a press release providing the rationale for
them. Since February 1999, with the intro-
duction of the Large Value Transfer System
(LVTS), the Bank has targeted the midpoint
of the operating band for the overnight rate
in its implementation of policy (see Bank of
Canada 1999).
Uncertainties
In conducting monetary policy, there
are uncertainties of various types that need
to be taken into account (see Thiessen 1995).
For example, it is difficult to be certain
about how actual output compares to what
the economy can produce with full, non-
inflationary utilization of resources (data
uncertainty). Assessment of the type
(demand or supply) and nature (persistence)
of the shocks that have an impact on the
economy must also be made (certainty
equivalence). In addition, the responses of
key variables to changes in the instrument
of monetary policy are not known with cer-
tainty (parameter uncertainty). And there is
uncertainty about the true model of the
economy (model uncertainty). The existence
of these, and other, uncertainties underscores
the need for a well-specified framework that
addresses “what if” questions at every stage
of the process. These would include alterna-
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look for output and inflation over the com-
ing year or so, including a qualitative
assessment of the risks and uncertainties.
Starting in 2000 the Bank began to provide
a semi-annual Update to the Monetary Policy
Report midway between the issues of the full
report. (Previously a commentary on the
economy was provided in the Bank of Canada
Review.) After release of each issue of the
Monetary Policy Report, senior Bank officials
appear before the Finance Committee of the
House of Commons to discuss the Report.
They also offer briefing sessions to a variety of
audiences in different regions of the country
and in major international financial centres.
More recently the Bank has introduced a
series of eight fixed dates for announcing
changes to the Bank Rate (see Bank of Canada
2000). On each date the Bank will issue a
press release, whether or not there is a change
in the Bank Rate, to explain the key factors
behind the decision. Fixed dates will reduce
uncertainty in financial markets associated
with not knowing exactly when the Bank
might announce an interest rate change. They
should also lead to greater focus on the eco-
nomic and monetary situation in Canada, put
greater emphasis on the medium-term per-
spective that underlies monetary policy, and
add to the Bank’s transparency, accountabili-
ty and ongoing dialogue with the public.
MONETARY POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF
CANADIANS IN THE 1990S
This section begins with a brief review
of the performance in the 1990s of one wide-
ly used, summary measure of economic well-
being and of the forces at play in the first half
of the 1990s. It then examines the accumu-
lation of evidence supporting the view that
the low and stable inflation established in the
1990s began to show tangible benefits in the
second half of the decade. A key development
was the shift in fiscal policy in the mid-
1990s to reverse over 20 years of deficit
financing and debt accumulation.
A Summary Measure of
Economic Well-Being
While economic well-being has many
facets, we focus on real GDP per capita as a
summary indicator of what happened to the
standard of living of Canadians over the
1990s. Advantages of using this measure are
its long time series, easy comprehension and
wide use. Other papers in this volume con-
sider the economic well-being of Canadians
from alternative perspectives.
As may be seen from Chart 3, real
GDP per capita in Canada, using 1989 as a
base period to be consistent with other stud-
ies, grew sluggishly on average over the
1990s. Taking a longer perspective, the
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jenkins.qxd  24/05/01  9:59 AM  Page 97growth in real GDP per capita on average
over the period from 1989 to 2000 was two
thirds of its approximately 2 percent growth
in the 1973 to 1989 period. However, it was
higher in the second half of the 1990s than
in the first half, averaging above the growth
rate over the 1973 to 1989 period.
Compared with the United States, the
Canadian economy did not perform as well
over the 1990s. Table 1 shows that there is a
clear split between the first and second halves
of the 1990s in terms of the reasons explain-
ing this difference.
During the first half of the period, the
fall in the employment/population ratio
accounted for most of the increasing gap in
GDP per capita growth with the United
States. For a detailed discussion of econom-
ic performance in Canada in the first half of
the 1990s, see Fortin (1996, 1999),
Freedman and Macklem (1998) and
Freedman (2001). Fortin (1996) advances
the hypothesis that Canada’s monetary pol-
icy of targeting low rates of inflation was
responsible for the weak levels of economic
activity in the early 1990s. Freedman and
Macklem (1998) challenge Fortin’s inter-
pretation, arguing that a combination of
factors was responsible for Canada’s weak
economic performance. Fortin (1999) and
Freedman (2001) continue the discussion.
Over the second half of the period, the
US/Canada gap is related to a greater acceler-
ation in the growth of labour productivity in
the United States. We argue below that the
surge in investment in machinery and equip-
ment that has occurred in Canada since 1996,
lagging behind the United States by about
four years, is beginning to show up in
Canadian productivity growth. This surge in
investment has coincided with the improve-
ment in our macroeconomic fundamentals,
which includes both a low and stable inflation
environment and declining levels of public
debt relative to the size of our economy.
The Starting Point for the 1990s
Canada entered the 1990s with a record
of persistent and volatile inflation, an accumu-
lating public debt and a widening technologi-
cal gap with the United States (see Thiessen
2000/01). Moreover, the negative effects of
these factors on economic performance were
interrelated. The inflation of the previous two
decades had left Canadians exposed to incipi-
ent inflation pressures and distorted relative
price signals, both of which encouraged spec-
ulative as opposed to productive investments.11
For a good part of the 1970s and 1980s gov-
ernments acted to protect individuals from
inflation through indexation, while at the same
time introducing structural increases in spend-
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TABLE 1
Decomposition of Growth in Real GDP Per Capita
Canada United  States 
1973-89 1989-2000  1989-95  1995-2000  1973-89 1989-  2000 1989-95 1995-2000 
Real GDP per worker 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.4 0.9 1.9 1.2 2.7 
Employment/  population  1.1 0.2 -0.7 1.3  1.0 0.3 0.0 0.7 
Real GDP per capita  2.1  1.4  0.3  2.7  2.0  2.2  1.2  3.4 
Note: Numbers may not add up exactly due to rounding. The periods indicate the base- and end-years for the levels
used to calculate the growth rates.
jenkins.qxd  24/05/01  9:59 AM  Page 98ing premised on faster economic growth than
occurred. The net outcome was a deep-seated
fiscal deficit and a growing public debt burden
(see Dodge 1998).
The relatively high inflation of the
1970s and 1980s led Canadian firms to look
for ways to benefit from inflation rather than
for ways to improve product design and
innovation, cost control and productivity. By
the early 1990s, it became clearer to
Canadian companies that they had some
catching up to do in a world much more
open to international competition. However,
the sharp drop in the prices of speculative
investments and the burden of servicing large
debts, as well as declining world commodi-
ty prices, made it difficult for them to pro-
ceed as quickly as they might have liked.
With defaults, restructurings and downsiz-
ings, economic activity and unemployment
took a long time to recover from the reces-
sion at the beginning of the 1990s, and in
many instances wages and salaries were
frozen or reduced. Despite these factors many
Canadian firms undertook restructuring
efforts in the 1990s (see Kwan 2000).12
In the early 1990s it had also become
clear that Canada’s public debt was accumu-
lating at an unsustainable rate, leading both
foreign and domestic investors to become nerv-
ous about holding Canadian government
bonds (see Robson and Scarth 1994). This
nervousness was componded by the fact that
Canada’s net foreign indebtedness was also on
an upward track as domestic spending was
maintained by borrowing from abroad through
a current account deficit. The result was sig-
nificant risk premiums in our interest rates.
Dodge (1998) concluded that Canada
had an inappropriate mix of fiscal and mone-
tary policy in the late 1980s/early 1990s. He
indicates that a contractionary macro policy
was warranted in the late 1980s and that, in
the circumstances (an already high public debt
relative to the size of the economy and the
introduction of the Free Trade Agreement
with the United States), it would have been
better to have tightened fiscal policy.
The Contribution of Monetary
Policy in the 1990s
In examining the contributions of mon-
etary policy to economic well-being in the
1990s, we start with the importance of eco-
nomic agents having confidence in what the
central bank is doing. Why agents would have
such confidence starts with the ability of the
monetary authorities to articulate a clear and
consistent framework for monetary policy. But
the cornerstone of that framework, and there-
fore of confidence among agents, is the estab-
lishment of a low inflation environment and
the expectation that such a situation will con-
tinue to prevail. In the case of Canadian mon-
etary policy, such confidence would mean that
the Bank of Canada had established credibili-
ty in the adoption and achievement of its
explicit inflation-control targets.
With credibility, inflation expectations
become firmly anchored to the inflation-con-
trol target. Reduced uncertainty about infla-
tion also makes it less risky to enter into longer
nominal contracts, and a credible stable price
environment allows longer-term instruments
in financial markets to be priced appropriate-
ly (e.g., lower risk premiums). In addition,
greater certainty about the objectives of
Canadian monetary policy reduces the econo-
my’s vulnerability to external financial market
shocks. Overall, these outcomes should allow
Canada to achieve a higher track for invest-
ment, productivity and the standard of living.
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necessary but not sufficient for good eco-
nomic outcomes” (Freedman 2001). In the
1990s the key development, over and above
low inflation, was the sharp shift in fiscal
policy in the middle of the decade to a
stance that would generate surpluses and
debt reduction.
Below, we present evidence that we
have begun to see the payoff from the low
and stable inflation environment established
in the 1990s.
Inflation and inflation expectations (cred-
ibility). Perrier and Amano (2000) note that
various surveys/indicators suggest that
expected inflation stood at about 5 percent
in 1990 and was around 2 percent by 1999.
Indeed, according to these surveys, for the
entire period during which the Bank has had
a target range for inflation, expected inflation
rates have remained within that range.
Medium-term inflation expectations have
also reacted very little to movements in the
CPI, suggesting that the targets have helped
to focus expectations on the target rate and
thus enhanced the credibility of monetary
policy (Chart 4). Perrier and Amano indicate
that most of the studies using these surveys
have concluded that success in keeping infla-
tion within the target range has indeed
helped to increase the credibility of Canadian
monetary policy. (See Perrier and Amano for
references.) Such a result is consistent with
what might be expected from a successful
track record (Blinder 2000).
In another study, St-Amant and Tessier
(2000) review the recent literature analysing
the experience of countries that have adopt-
ed inflation targets and report on some sim-
ple statistical tests for determining the link
between the adoption of inflation targets and
the credibility of monetary policy. The liter-
ature survey and empirical results lead St-
Amant and Tessier to conclude that certain
statistical properties of inflation (for exam-
ple, a reduced effect of shocks on ongoing
inflation) may have changed in some coun-
tries in recent years, and that monetary poli-
cy seems to have become more credible in a
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However, they caution that the available data
do not allow them to state with any certain-
ty that explicit inflation targets have played
a significant role in these changes.
It is nevertheless evident that the focus
on preserving a low and stable inflation envi-
ronment has resulted in a substantial reduction
in the variability of inflation. The standard
deviation of core inflation, the year-to-year
change in the CPI excluding food, energy and
the effects of indirect taxes, relative to its target
has fallen to 0.6 percentage points in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s from between 2 and 3
percentage points historically.13 This reduction
in inflation variability tied to a low-inflation
environment allows people to take a longer
view with respect to their planning and to bet-
ter perceive the trade-offs that they face in their
transactions.14This in turn leads to a better allo-
cation of economic and financial resources.
Labour and product markets. Examples
of how a more stable price environment
allows people to take a longer view on plan-
ning can be found in the labour and hous-
ing markets. In labour markets, there has
been a reduction in person days lost due to
strikes, a lengthening of the life of collec-
tive wage agreements in Canada and a
decline in the number of such agreements
containing cost-of-living adjustment
(COLA) clauses (Table 2).15 As to the hous-
ing market, the proportion of mortgages
with five-year terms is now higher than it
was in the mid-1980s, and many financial
institutions have been offering 7- to 10-year
mortgages (on the former, see Montplaisir
1996/97; Howitt 1997).
For suppliers of goods and services,
having a clearer idea of relative price move-
ments should enable them to better judge
shifts in market conditions and their ability
to pass higher costs on to their clients.
Indeed, in a low-inflation environment sup-
pliers can better identify areas where they
can make adjustments to contain costs and
increase productivity (see Harberger 1998).
The apparent reduction in the pass through
to consumer prices of the price-level effect
of the depreciations of the Canadian dollar
in the 1990s is one important example of
how a low, stable inflation environment may
be changing price-setting behaviour (see
Technical Box 2 in the November 2000
Monetary Policy Report). Another example
would appear to be the low pass through to
core CPI from the recent sharp increases in
energy prices, although the evidence is more
limited on this question.
Another possible explanation for a
lower pass through of relative price changes
in an environment of low and stable inflation
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TABLE 2
Selected Indicators Pertaining to Wage Negotiations
Period Average Life of  Proportion of Wage  Work Stoppages
Wage Settlements  Settlements with COLA  (percentage of working  
(months) Clauses (%) time lost to strikes)
1978-1990 24.2  23.4 0.23 
1991-1995 25.5  14.9  0.06
1996-2000 34.0  10.5 0.09 
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may be reduced (see Taylor 2000 for some
empirical evidence). As a result, there is less
reason for suppliers of goods and services to
change their expectations about inflation,
especially the trend rate.
Financial markets. There are various
ways in which inflation interacts with the
functioning of financial markets. An obvious
example is the maturity spectrum on which
financial market participants would want to
focus their attention. In a period of high and
volatile inflation, lenders and borrowers do
not want to commit to long-term arrange-
ments. As a result, participants would either
switch to short-term arrangements or
demand a higher term premium than other-
wise. In the early 1980s the Government of
Canada had to offer extendible terms to fund
its requirements. Another response by finan-
cial market participants to high inflation is
to focus their attention on particular markets
(equities versus bonds, for example).
Financial market participants will also be
concerned about being the last one out of
particular markets in periods when markets
are unsettled. As a result, funds are likely to
quickly leave countries where there are con-
cerns about macroeconomic policies and be
slow to return.
With respect to financial market
activity in Canada, the use of long-term
financial instruments by firms fell over the
course of the 1970s and recovered as infla-
tion moved down (top panel of Chart 5). In
addition to the term for mortgages noted
above, shifts occurred in the use of markets
for debt (Miville and Bernier 1999) and
equities (see bottom two panels of Chart
5).16 Risk premiums, as reflected in the
spread between the returns on 10-year gov-
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States, moved down as inflation became low
and stable and as the fiscal situation
improved (see Chart 6). More specifically
focusing on the inflation-risk premium,
Fung, Mitnick and Remolona (1999) show
the inflation-risk premium on Canadian
five-year bonds as peaking in 1991 and
declining slowly but flattening out at a rate
close to that in the United States only
around the beginning of 1998 (Chart 5a in
their paper).
A potentially more telling example of
the difficulties that inflation causes was first
noted by Modigliani and Cohn (1979). This
is more telling in the sense that more of the
people involved should have been relative-
ly sophisticated in dealing with inflation.
The hypothesis of Modigliani and Cohn was
that investors in the 1970s tended to incor-
rectly discount the expected real earnings of
firms by using the nominal discount rate
(instead of the real discount rate) and, in
addition, did not take account of the real
depreciation of the nominal liabilities of
firms when estimating the real earnings of
companies. Recent work suggests that the
more accurate valuations obtained with low
inflation in the United States after the early
1980s resulted in an economically signifi-
cant improvement in the average annual real
rate of return on equities (see Ritter and
Warr 1999; Sharpe 2000).17
Other evidence that a more transparent
monetary policy may be improving the func-
tioning of financial markets can be derived
from the market response to policy
announcements. In this vein, Muller and
Zelmer (1999) report on empirical tests on
whether or not the efforts at increasing the
Bank of Canada’s level of transparency have
in fact decreased the market’s reactions to
official monetary policy rate changes. The
hypothesis is that greater transparency should
“result in reduced conditional uncertainty
because investor expectations would be
formed with a superior information set.” It is
stated that “the Bank’s efforts at increasing
transparency appear to have helped market
participants anticipate pending monetary
policy actions.” However, as noted in the
conclusion of the paper, the results are also
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TABLE 3
Selected Indicators of Macroeconomic Activity
1
Period Average Annual Average Annual Average Average Annual Nominal Machinery and
Growth in Real  Growth in Unemployment Growth in Output Equipment Investment
GDP Per Capita  Employment Rate Per Person Hour as a Percentage
of Nominal GDP 
1973-89 2.1 2.3 8.4  1.3  3.6
1989-95 0.3 0.5 10.1 1.2 5.4 
1995-00 2.7 2.2 8.3 1.3 7.9 
1998 2.4 2.6 8.3 1.0 7.8 
1999 3.7 2.8 7.6 1.6 8.6 
2000 3.8 2.6 6.8 1.7 9.8 
1 The periods indicate the base- and end-years for the levels used to calculate the growth rates. For level series, like the
average unemployment rate, the years correspond to those for growth rates (for 1989-95 inclusive this means 1990-95
inclusive).
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unobserved factor that is not associated with
the increased transparency of the conduct of
monetary policy.
In work focused on assessing the
understanding by financial market partici-
pants of the monetary policy reaction func-
tion, Gravelle and Moessner (2001) report
that an investigation of asset price reactions
to macroeconomic surprises finds no dis-
cernible increase in interest rate reactions to
Canadian macroeconomic data over their
short sample period (early 1995 to
September 2000).18 The authors suggest
that the Bank’s concern with exchange rate
volatility at times in their sample period
might have made it difficult for market par-
ticipants to be sure about the Bank’s mon-
etary policy reaction function. They
hypothesize that, to the extent that finan-
cial market participants still hold such an
impression, it might change after they have
some experience with fixed dates for
announcing monetary policy changes, given
that these dates will focus attention on the
Canadian economic situation.
The mix of policy. As noted above, over
the 1980s Canada’s overall fiscal position
deteriorated despite a stated commitment by
the federal government to deficit reduction
and despite an extended period of strong eco-
nomic activity (see Drummond in this vol-
ume). In the early 1990s, concerns began to
be expressed more widely and systematically
about the sustainability of rising government
debt levels in Canada.
This situation led to a risk premium on
financial instruments associated with the rap-
idly rising public sector debt levels, increased
further at times by uncertainty about the
future of the Canadian federation. In addition,
the rising fiscal debt-to-GDP ratios led the
financial markets to be sceptical about the
ability of the Bank to achieve the inflation tar-
get set by it and the government, creating an
inflation-risk premium. As a result the Bank
was unable to ease monetary policy as much
as it wanted to at points early in the inflation-
target period (see Clinton and Zelmer 1997).
Indeed, it was only after concerted action was
taken in the mid-1990s, at both the federal
and provincial level, to eliminate deficit
financing and reduce the burden of debt that
interest rates in Canada fell to levels consistent
with our low-inflation environment.
Another example of how the reinforcing
mix of monetary and fiscal policy in the second
half of the 1990s contributed to improving our
economic prospects is the comparison between
the financial market reaction to and the recov-
ery of the economy from the 1994-95 Mexican
crisis and the 1997-98 Asian crisis (aggravat-
ed by the Russian default on its debt service
payments in August 1998). The interest rate
rise was smaller and unwound more quickly in
the case of the Asian crisis than in the case of
the Mexican crisis. As a result, economic activ-
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ered to an even higher pace sooner than it did
following the Mexican crisis.
Economic activity. The Canadian economy
went through a difficult period of adjustment
in the first half of the 1990s. And, as noted ear-
lier, there are differences of view as to the most
important factors that explain the sub-par per-
formance of the economy during this period.
The performance of the economy in the second
half of the 1990s stands in sharp contrast.
Canada’s underlying inflation has been low and
stable, and economic growth has been strong
(see Knight 2000 and Table 3).
Admittedly, some of the growth in the
second half of the 1990s reflected a recovery
from the weakness in the first half. However,
given that the period included the Asian crisis
beginning in 1997, the strong growth in the
second half of the decade is evidence of how an
environment of low and stable inflation in con-
junction with prudent fiscal management has
improved the underpinnings and performance
of the Canadian economy.
In reviewing the performance of the US
economy over the period 1982 to 1996, Taylor
(1998) called it a “long boom” and suggested
that monetary policy was a key factor in its
achievement, in particular the emphasis on
keeping inflation low and stable. Among the
problems he noted was that labour productiv-
ity growth had been much lower than during
past periods of U.S. history. He then discussed
the advantages to the US economy of rising
productivity growth, which subsequently
occurred. Freedman (2001) notes that the
upturn in investment in machinery and equip-
ment occurred in 1992 in the United States
versus 1996 in Canada. Once the US economy
experienced this pick-up in investment, high-
er rates of productivity growth followed rough-
ly four years later. There are indications that
Canada’s productivity growth is picking up
with the recent growth rates moving towards
the 2 percent range (see Table 3).
Another measure of the payoff from a
low and stable inflation environment would be
a lower variability of output. Amano, Coletti
and Macklem (1999) report results of stochas-
tic simulations of a model of the Canadian
economy where a higher credibility for mone-
tary policy is assumed. These results show
more stable output when policy is credible.
Work by Debs (2000) provides evidence that
a structural break in the volatility of output
growth occurred in Canada in early 1991.
Given its coincidence with the structural
change in monetary policy, Debs notes that his
result may reflect a reduction in the magnitude
of the boom-bust cycles arising from the focus
of monetary policy on achieving and main-
taining low, stable inflation.
Output volatility measured as the stan-
dard deviation of the output gap (the difference
between actual and potential output) shows a
reduction in the second half of the 1990s. Its
standard deviation over the period 1973 to
1989 and the first half of the 1990s was essen-
tially the same, before moving down somewhat
in the second half of the 1990s. This result is
consistent with the view that a more rapid pol-
icy response to anticipated movements in infla-
tion above and below the inflation target
should moderate the effects of demand shocks.
CONCLUSION
This paper outlines the fundamental
changes that occurred in the monetary policy
framework of the Bank of Canada in the
1990s. Starting with the introduction of
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ened through subsequent measures to increase
transparency and accountability, a low and sta-
ble inflation environment has been established
in Canada. This is clearly seen in that medi-
um- and long-run inflation expectations have
become firmly anchored to the midpoint of
the 1 to 3 percent target range for inflation
control. Creating a clear and consistent frame-
work is one of the major contributions of
monetary policy in the 1990s.
The transition to a low, stable and pre-
dictable inflation environment, however, was
not without cost. The deep-seated inflation
psychology going into the 1990s as a result of
the experience of the two previous decades,
together with fiscal policy on an unsustainable
track because of nearly 20 years of deficit
financing, resulted in a difficult period of
adjustment for the Canadian economy in the
first half of the 1990s.
It was only after the dramatic shift in
fiscal policy in the mid-1990s that overall
macroeconomic conditions, including very
importantly low inflation, began to produce the
desired policy outcome of sustained growth at
high levels of activity, and to encourage invest-
ment in new equipment and technology neces-
sary for a pick-up in productivity growth. The
role that monetary policy played to support this
change of behaviour and improved economic
performance through low inflation represents
its other major contribution to the economic
well-being of Canadians in the 1990s.
NOTES
The views herein are our own, and no responsi-
bility for them should be attributed to the Bank
of Canada or to anyone else. We would like to
thank our colleagues at the Bank of Canada and
participants at a workshop hosted by CSLS and
IRPP, especially our discussant Brian MacLean,
for comments. Annie De Champlain and Andrew
Evans provided research assistance. Any errors
that remain are solely ours.
1 Taken from Arnold C. Harberger’s Presidential
Address to the American Economic Association
(Harberger 1998).
2 See Crow (1988) for reasons why a monetary pol-
icy that promotes stability in the value of money
is the best contribution that a central bank could
make to raising living standards.
3 See Mishkin (1997) for more elaboration on the
arguments in the early part of this section.
4 Of course, there are countries where indexation
has been used extensively (Brazil in the early
1990s, for example). However, most of these
countries have moved away from using indexa-
tion for various reasons, most importantly
because of the difficulties it poses for the adjust-
ment of the economy to real shocks. Indexation
also makes a policy of disinflation more difficult.
5 See the examples in “Five-Year Tax Reduction
Plan.” Chapter 4 in the Budget Plan, February
2000. For an indication of how the interaction of
inflation with the tax system can have potential-
ly large effects, see Black, Macklem and Poloz
(1994) and O’Reilly and Levac (2000) and some
of the references in these papers.
6 More recently, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000)
have advanced the idea that at a particularly low
inflation rate, workers do not pay such close
attention to inflation in their wage negotiations,
with the result that real wage offers can be lower
than they otherwise would be and hence the
unemployment rate lower. The implications of
this work lead to some of the same conclusions
for the definition of optimal inflation in the
United States, as does their earlier work on down-
ward nominal wage rigidity. Fortin and Dumont
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jenkins.qxd  24/05/01  9:59 AM  Page 106(2000), replicating this work for Canada, reach
the same conclusion as Fortin (1996) for the
choice of the target rate of inflation.
7 For an overview of the evolution of the monetary
policy framework during the existence of the
Bank of Canada see Gordon Thiessen (1998/99,
2000/01).
8 For some theoretical and simulation work that
has elements of this framework and shows that
they contribute to the credibility of the inflation
target, see Yetman (2001).
9 Although the targets are specified in terms of the
total CPI, the Bank uses the core CPI (CPI
excluding food, energy and the effect of changes
in indirect taxes) as the basis for policy actions.
Therefore, core CPI is the operational guide for
monetary policy. Provided fluctuations in food
and energy prices have only temporary effects on
inflation, the total and core measures of the CPI
would move in a similar fashion over the medi-
um term.
10 To undertake economic projections and to address
“what if” questions, a number of internal changes
dealing with monetary policy decision-making in
an uncertain world were made at the Bank in the
1990s (see Duguay and Poloz 1994; Duguay and
Longworth 1998; Longworth and Freedman 2000).
Complete descriptions of the philosophy, theory
and form of the models used in staff projections and
policy analysis are provided in Black, Laxton et al.
(1994) and Coletti et al. (1996). For a discussion of
monetary conditions and how the monetary condi-
tions index was and is used at the Bank of Canada,
see Freedman (1995, 2000).
11 With inflationary pressures in Canada greater
than those in the United States, and with a more
deeply entrenched inflation psychology in
Canada, the recession here was more severe than
in the United States. Taylor (1998) suggests that
inflationary psychology had been arrested in the
early 1980s in the United States.
12 Ip (1998) and Ip, King and Verdier (1999) pro-
vide some evidence on the supply side of the
labour market.
13 Prior to 1984, the CPI excluding food and ener-
gy was used. For the period 1964:Q1 to 1991:Q1
(1971:Q1 to 1991:Q1), the standard deviation
was 2.0 (2.6) percentage points.
14 Consider the case of a firm making decisions to
change prices. For a firm that fixes its nominal
prices for a period of time, inflation will cause its
relative prices to change over time, depending on
the economy-wide inflation rate. The relative
prices of such a firm will change more slowly in a
low-inflation than in a high-inflation environ-
ment. As a result, it will take longer for the firm
to incur the cost of adjusting its nominal prices
to reset its relative prices.
15 The reduction in person days lost due to strikes
may be in part related to fear of losing jobs in a
period of excess supply. However, in the latter
parts of the 1980s and 1990s when economic
activity was strong there were declines in this
ratio. The ratio was lower in the latter part of the
1990s than it was in the 1980s, as was inflation.
16 These are components of the total shown in the
top panel. The data on business credit and its
components are taken from Table E2 of the Bank
of Canada Review. Long-term business credit is
the same as the term “other business credit” used
in Table E2 and includes such financing instru-
ments as non-residential mortgages, leasing
receivables, bonds and debentures and equity.
17 Sharpe (2000) notes some of the shortcomings of
the Modigliani and Cohn (M-C) work but con-
cludes that “Nonetheless, in an important sense,
the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis — that equity
prices are distorted by money illusion — could
well have been close to the mark.” Sharpe
hypothesizes that investors might have used a
nominal interest rate to discount expected nom-
inal earnings (rather than real earnings as in 
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jenkins.qxd  24/05/01  9:59 AM  Page 107M-C) with the expectations of nominal earnings
“contaminated by money illusion” (p. 29).
18 This sample period was also one in which Canada
and the United States experienced strong economic
growth, leading to similar moves in interest rates
on a number of occasions, although not all the time.
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